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Executive Summary 
Misinformation in the form of “fake news” can potentially be weaponized by malicious actors to 
undermine Canada’s national security and government infrastructure. Developing a 
comprehensive database to track and understand potential threat actors and their use of fake news 
can potentially provide actionable intel, thereby exposing and publicly challenging fake news 
items. Fake news has been used to negatively influence the reputation of government officials and 
to incite violence between ethnic groups. Fake news utilizes confirmation bias (the tendency to 
interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing beliefs or theories) through disseminating 
meticulously crafted messages to targeted audiences, who are selected based on their online 
activities.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this briefing note is to examine the use of misinformation, with a focus on fake 
news as a potential weapon of information warfare. This may inform any responses to the threat 
of misinformation that are potentially being utilized to undermine Canada’s national security, 
Canada’s democratic process, and the integrity of Canadian institutions. 
The Security Problem 
The dissemination of misinformation, particularly in the form of fake news distributed through 
social media channels, can be exploited by organizations and individual actors to spread fear, 
invoke hatred, or subvert the confidence of Canadian citizens in the Government of Canada, its 
elected officials, institutions and policies. Since social media provides an audience, it gives 
creators of fake news the power to nefariously unite or divide populations who put their trust in 
“news” items they see online.  
Background 
Evidence suggests that Canadians are susceptible to fake news. Earlier this year, it was reported 
that a web-based news service operating as The Buffalo Chronicle had published a fake news story 
about the Bank of Montreal allegedly offering bribes to avoid government prosecution, as well as 
additional stories alleging that political power struggles were taking place within the Liberal party 
(Ling, 2019). All aspects of this story were fake and were shared on social media. Moreover, the 
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story from the Buffalo Chronicle was allegedly shared on Twitter by two sitting members of 
Parliament (Ling, 2019). 
Misinformation in the form of fake news can be utilized to incite violence. In Nigeria, Berom 
vigilantes appear to have been motivated by fake news to attack and kill Fulani Muslims. 
Furthermore, according to Matthias, the PR officer for Plateau State police, killings motivated by 
fake news are common occurrences in Plateau State (Adegoke, 2018). 
It has been argued that the increase in the ability for individuals to “access, create, and share 
information,” in combination with limits to the amount of information individuals can “attend to 
from outside sources” has created an environment that is conducive for the spread of fake news 
(Hills, 2019, p. 323). This is due to a heightened reliance on bias by individuals to process 
information, in an environment that is over-saturated with sources of information (Hills, 2019). 
Canadian academics suggested that in the past, one could see what information the public was 
exposed to through reading the newspaper, which acted as a central source for news and 
information on current events. However, it is now more difficult to understand what information 
the public is exposed to due to varying information being delivered to varying targets, through 
multiple media outlets (Semple, 2019).  
Algorithms and other AI-driven systems can be deployed to flag false or misleading content that 
is then removed. However, as evidenced by a fake news detection algorithm evaluating video 
footage of the 2019 Notre Dame fire, as related to the 9/11 attacks, this approach arguably still 
faces some key technical challenges (Timberg & Harwell, 2019). Furthermore, this approach also 
requires the continued cooperation and support of private stakeholders (social media service 
providers) to be implemented and achieve sustainable results.   
Key Considerations and Implications 
Misinformation could be used to interfere with the upcoming October 2019 Federal Election. It 
has been suggested that foreign actors could be motivated to influence the upcoming Canadian 
Federal Elections because of Russia and Canada’s colliding interests in the “Arctic,… Ukraine 
and…Baltic states” (Sevunts, 2019, para. 2). Patterns of foreign influence in the past can be seen 
in the Alberta General Election in April 2019. The election  reportedly saw both domestic and 
foreign influence through inauthentic social media accounts (Tunney, 2019). The election in 
Alberta allegedly drew foreign attention because its energy industry affected foreign interests and 
would have international implications (Tunney, 2019).  
The problem is not necessarily the difficulty in confronting misinformation, the problem is 
arguably the weaponization of confirmation bias by an adversary. This can involve the deliberate 
targeting of populations who are believed to hold a particular worldview, with specific messaging 
and effectively conducting a precision PSYOPS campaign. Arguably, this has become feasible by 
utilizing social media for conducting target reconnaissance, maximizing exposure and creating an 
element of plausible deniability. Potentially contentious topics can be identified on social media 
and then linked to false reports that are created to appear to be from a legitimate looking news 
CASIS-Vancouver 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 
Volume 2, Issue 2 
  
 
3 
source. As has been noted, “propaganda preys on pre-existing grievances” and social media 
provides a useful tool for identifying such grievances (Greenspon & Owen, 2017, para. 10). Bot-
nets can be utilized to spread stories, increasing the probability that a human will engage and share 
the story with their private contacts and social media audience. This can assist in hiding the 
influence of bot-nets in spreading fake news, as well as continuing to spread misinformation.  
Although it is unclear if extremist groups have or will play a direct role in creating fake news, 
evidence suggests they have engaged with this type of material online, and may continue to play 
an active role in disseminating fake news (Solon, 2018). Furthermore, violent actions undertaken 
by extremists may be motivated in part as a result of their engagement with fake news and a 
perceived escalation of grievances. 
Alternative Perspectives to be Considered 
There may be measures that can be deployed to effectively mitigate the problem of  “weaponized 
confirmation bias,” through the use of fake news by educating the public. It has been argued that 
the general population can be “inoculated” against fake news through educational materials, 
including but not limited to the use of interactive media (games), in which the participant acts as 
a purveyor of fake news (Guerrini, 2018; Foster, 2019). Exposure to qualified fake news traits and 
examples could potentially mitigate the impact of widely-spread misinformation. However, the 
current low engagement with these fake news games arguably presents a key challenge with this 
approach (Smith, 2018). Furthermore, the voluntary nature of this method may present a key 
challenge in getting the message to the general public. 
What is Not Known  
The full impact of “social bots” (software-controlled profiles or pages) that have been used to 
facilitate and support the spread of misinformation is not entirely known (Shao et al., 2017). A 
quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of misinformation-spreading attacks based on social bots 
is required to fully understand their impact. 
Furthermore, the exact impact that fake news has had on any public perceptions or on public 
opinions regarding specific issues is not yet clear. This will arguably remain as an unknown until 
the development of a more sophisticated set of metrics can be developed to measure the impact of 
fake news. Moreover, the full extent that any planned and coordinated operations aimed at 
spreading misinformation have already occurred in Canada is not currently known. 
Finally, until it is addressed in a court of law, it may not be fully known as to what extent any 
legislation or other such measures undertaken by the government, seeking to limit or penalize the 
publication and/or the dissemination of fake news, will be considered permissible under the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Next Steps 
• Conduct additional research on the role and use of social bots in spreading fake news, with 
a focused analysis of Canadian content. 
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• Investigate fake news stories that have received significant engagement online. Focus on 
whether there is any evidence to support any measures of coordination or organization in 
how the content was distributed and/or the intention behind the creation of the content.  
• Determine whether any metrics that apply to online content (eg; marketing) can be utilized 
to assist in the creation of metrics designed to specifically measure the impact of fake news. 
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